There are inherent dangers of unquestioned adherence to doctrine; however, given historical examples of the success between doctrine and strategy in regards to Close Air Support (CAS) suggests the Air Force work closely with the Army as they transform their brigades to lighter more agile combat units with less organic artillery. Army Transformation's intent is to create a lighter more mobile force, consisting of more combat units. The future Army will not have divisional and corps supporting artillery brigades and this will result in less supporting and reinforcing fires. Engaged brigades will have to depend on their own fire support and Air Force air assets to carry the day. The Army's creation of more combat units will generate a corresponding requirement to increase the total number of Terminal Attack In short, the United States needs to transform its military to exploit technological and asymmetric advantages well into the future. The Air Force continues to work its own transformation requirements while at the same time taking a proactive role in refining old concepts and doctrine as well as developing new concepts and doctrine to support Army Transformation initiatives. The Air Force is working hard to improve its interoperability with the Army at all levels and remains fully committed to the Close Air Support (CAS) mission. 3 The ability to call and effectively employ airpower in the CAS role is as important now as it ever was in our military's past.
The Air Force is aggressively pursuing the ways and means to support Army
Transformation initiatives by increasing the number of JTACs and associated command and control to support one of the Army's Transformation visions: organizational transformation that will consist of more numerous brigades of lighter composition.
The number of CAS sorties or the battle space to be covered due to Army Transformation is not addressed in this monograph; however, the increased number of combat brigades proposed by the Army will require an increased number of Air Force personnel assigned to support those individual Army units. In short, Army Transformation will affect, to a small extent, the number of air liaison officers (ALO) assigned to brigades. Of greater concern is the larger number of Airmen required to provide terminal attack control for CAS sorties. 4 The character of conflict and threats to the national defense of the United States has changed. The armed forces of the United States must transform to meet the changing threats.
However, one constant that will remain is friendly troops on the ground meeting the enemy. The
Air Force needs to have the resources available to shape the battlefield, support friendly ground forces conducting offensive operations, neutralize the enemy in defensive positions, and destroy an attacking enemy. Prevailing against adversaries will require new and advanced systems, 
Background Information
The Army has addressed transformation many times throughout history to include "Army Army organizational transformation has two distinct and separate paths that will affect its current force. The first of these changes includes an increase in the total number of BCTs to 70 active and reserve BCTs. 7 At the same time, the brigades will reorganize into two new types of combat formations: Heavy BCT and Light BCT. To make these new BCTs lighter and more agile on the battlefield, they will constitute a force that is 70 percent smaller in terms of current heavy battalions, 63 percent smaller in terms of heavy companies and 11 percent smaller in terms of infantry battalions. These new combat brigades are lighter than their predecessors being replaced and the Army's doctrinal intent is to disperse these lighter more agile units over a greater area making them harder for enemy forces to find, track and target. 8 The heavy BCT will have two combined-arms maneuver battalions each with two armor companies equipped with M1 Abrams tanks, two mechanized infantry companies equipped with M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, a strike battalion equipped with self-propelled howitzers and associated target-acquisition equipment, and other elements allowing the brigade to operate relatively autonomously. 9 The light BCT will have two infantry battalions, a strike battalion equipped with towed field artillery, and various support units. 10 These lighter brigades will come at a cost. They will have less organic fire support directly available thus making them more reliant on other sources for fire support such as Army attack aviation and Air Force CAS. This reduction in indirect fires is critical to making the BCT lighter and more mobile. As it fights dispersed across the area of operation, it may not be able to receive fire support previously available from division or corps assets. Although these BCTs have organic fires; what they will lack are reinforcing and general supporting fires that would normally come from divisional fires.
The second major change for Army formations is the creation of the Stryker Brigade.
Stryker brigades are intended to bridge the gap between the Army's current force structure in light forces, which are easily deployed but not well protected or lethal, and its heavy forces, which are well protected and lethal but not easily deployed. 11 Stryker brigades are optimized to operate semi-independently in smaller-scale contingencies and have some organic capabilities that most other brigades would have to receive from higher echelons such as a field artillery battalion. 12 Because the Stryker brigade is expected to operate independently in many smallerscale contingencies, these capabilities have been integrated into its organization. 13 The Stryker and Modular BCTs are lighter than their predecessors resulting in greater speed and agility on the battlefield. The Army plans to take advantage of Stryker and Modular BCTs speed and agility by dispersing these units over more territory than current units. 14 In summery:
• The Army is ambitiously reorganizing its war-fighting units and it's happening now
• By increasing the number of combat brigades into more mobile, versatile units over the next three years, the Army hopes it will generate about 10 more active component brigades within its current end strength • The Army is restructuring to increase the number of maneuver brigades from the current 33 to between 43 and 48. The 3rd Infantry Division, Airborne Division (Air Assault), and 4ID are at the leading edge of this change.
• The current Army organization will change from divisional to a brigade-based Army
• The Army will take much of the structure in the division, and some at the Corps level, and create powerful, broad-spectrum, brigade-level combat teams that are much more capable of independent action • Currently, to get a broad-spectrum modular force, the Army starts with a brigade and then will add in all the enablers and then reinforce/task organize as needed.
• BCTs will be permanently task-organized so as to require minimal augmentation, if any. The obvious advantage is the ability to train and work with all of their organic units.
• Divisions/Corps will still have important roles, and will become capable of being used as JTF headquarters as the Army moves to a modular brigade design. There will still be Corps level entities that will in all probability operate more at the operational level • Active and Reserve units will have the same organizational designs
• Brigade-sized units will be packaged to deploy more rapidly than Divisions and are Table 1 below and reveal that units tend to have greater fire support when they participate in major combat operations, such as Operation DESERT STORM, than they do in smaller contingencies, such as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 15 This should not be a great surprise. However, even in major combat operations, fire support potential appears to have been declining over time. Brigades in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had fewer munitions available for fire support assets than brigades in Operation DESERT STORM, and heavy Modular BCTs will have fewer still. 16 The RAND study estimated that heavy Modular BCTs will have only 25 percent of the fire support that was provided to heavy brigades in 1991. 17 RAND's analysis indicated that future brigades will have less fire support potential, measured in terms of both the total number of munitions for fire support assets and the weight of fire, than historical brigades had available.
This 75 percent reduction in organic fire support along with the greater dispersion of Army units will make them more reliant on Air Force CAS. 18 Air power will be critical to the success or even to the survival of Army formations because the Army will have a greater reliance on CAS to replace previously available organic fire support. Table 1 19
The Army's vision of organizational transformation will have great effects on the Air Force.
Careful and deliberate dialog and coordination must occur between the Army and the Air Force in order to limit the impact on Air Force programs and maintain current capabilities. This is particularly true in order to maintain the improved capabilities and capitalize on the recent lessons learned in the employment of CAS in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
Air and space power is tremendously flexible and can perform many operational functions.
The Air Force provides seventeen operational functions to the Joint Force Commander.
Counterland is one of the operational functions of air and space power and is defined as actions from the air and or space to dominate the land environment. 20 Counterland operations provides controller, now known as a JTAC 21 , is one aspect that has greatly improved the effectiveness of CAS and has been instrumental in directing air strikes against the enemy from a forward position for many years.
Clearly, military force can be detrimental or inappropriate to some objectives, especially if the force used is perceived to be disproportionate to the objective. When the use of the military instrument of power is appropriate, the enemy should be positively identified, objectives clearly stipulated, forces and supporting resources appropriately allocated, and restrictions and limitations delineated. Modern technology enables lethal force to be applied more precisely, thus helping to minimize collateral damage and reduce the potential for inadvertent alienation of the civilian population. 22 JTACs, on the ground with Army units engaged with the enemy, greatly aid in achieving objectives and desired affects against the enemy while adhering to restrictions, limitations and minimizing collateral damage.
The JTACs' mission is a highly demanding and often complex. JTACs understand the ground commander's situation and intent. They are experts in the tactical application of air power, have terminal attack control authority which is paramount to the safety of our own troops and aircraft. At the same time, JTACs ensure positive target identification, desired effects against the enemy are achieved and that proportionality with minimal collateral damage is maintained.
Terminal attack control may be accomplished by airborne fighters such as Forward Air power. 30 The Air Force training model for JTACs is a 3-phased approach. Phase 1 training is completed at the candidates' home station where they are considered a JTAC apprentice. They must accomplish academics as defined in a comprehensive master task list, accomplish a minimum of four graded CAS controls and four CAS control simulator missions; phase 2 training is accomplished at the Air Ground Operations School located at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and consists of academics, four graded CAS control simulator missions, and four graded CAS control missions (minimum); phase 3 training is completed at the candidates home station where they accomplish mission qualification training which entails another four successfully graded CAS controls followed by a mission checkride. 31 Successful completion of the mission checkride results in JTAC certification. 32 It typically takes up to two years for a JTAC candidate to complete all three phases of training to become a certified JTAC and awarded the Air Force specialty code. 33 After certification, JTACs are required to accomplish a minimum of 12 controls of aircraft dropping live munitions per year. 34 The requirements are further broken down to six controls per fiscal year half and at least four must be with fighter/attack aircraft and two may be bomber aircraft. 35 This is a minimum requirement of CAS controls and experience has shown a more realistic number of 20 controls per year are required to maintain any real type of proficiency. 
Requirement for Increased Ground JTACs
As has already been shown, the Army's current reliance on CAS is on the increase, resulting in a corresponding demand for JTACs. JTACs were well integrated with ground forces down to the company level and instrumental to their unit's successes in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. 37 However, Air Force JTACs are in short supply.
According to Air Force planning factors for each type of Army unit, the pre-transformation Army force structure required 292 two-person JTAC elements. 38 Table 2 below illustrates the mix of brigades in the Army force structure and the number of TAC elements assigned to each type of brigade. Table 2 39
According to a RAND study discussing Army Transformation, "The Army has not yet formally articulated its requirement for TACs with Modular BCTs and Stryker brigades, but it will probably be higher than the requirement for maneuver brigades in the current force." 40 It should be noted though, that Army planners have reportedly notified Air Force planners that they will likely request a JTAC for each maneuver company in the Modular BCTs and Stryker brigades due to their lighter composition, dispersion tactics and trends previously mentioned regarding firepower. 41 If this is the case, each Stryker brigade would require up to 16 JTAC elements or 32 additional JTACs (see Table 3 ). This is a total increase from 292 two-man teams to 330 twoman teams or an additional 76 JTACs from an already stressed Air Force career field. Table 3 42
Stryker brigades will add modestly to the requirement for JTACs, but the conversions to Modular BCTs could add dramatically to the requirement, especially when heavy units begin to convert and when the 10 additional Modular BCTs are created. According to 45 The Services must be flexible and forward thinking in order to meet and defeat any enemy targeting the United States, our Allies and or our forces abroad. The threats facing the United States are numerous as are their weapons and tactics. so we too must change in order to meet these evolving threats.
There JTACs play a critical role in the effective employment of CAS. They are a vital link between air and land forces on symmetric and asymmetric battlefields thereby providing the ability to meet desired capabilities and attributes as defined by guidelines in our national defense strategy. The changing security environment, enemy responses to U.S. air power, and Army Transformation initiatives have substantially increased the demands for JTACs. 46 The expansion of the number of JTACs is currently in progress but there are significant challenges that must be overcome to expand the JTAC force. The JTAC function is very demanding and relatively few people have the situational awareness and capability to handle the demands of the job. It takes up takes up to two years and considerable training and resources to become a certified JTAC. 47 To remain certified, JTACs must control a minimum of 12 live controls of aircraft, 8 of which must be fighters each year. 48 Given the many demands on aircraft, it is unlikely that the number of sorties available for JTAC training can be dramatically increased in the near term. 49 One of the many challenges to maintaining a proficient JTAC cadre will be the high Operation DESERT STORM and more recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven the importance as well as the intricacy required to properly integrate air power with friendly ground forces. CAS requires detailed integration of air and ground operations to ensure a very high degree of confidence that air-delivered ordnance will strike the correct and only the correct target. Friendly ground forces make it important to deliver weapons precisely and discriminately. Most obviously, the proximity of civilians to the targets being attacked may necessitate as much care and restraint in an attack as would be required if friendly military forces were nearby. Also important in the detailed integration is to make sure there is minimal collateral damage and that our aircraft will not be hit by friendly fire. No other employment of air power requires this extreme and laborious degree of coordination because friendly forces are safely out of the way.
